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Employment-based health insurance is the main source of health coverage for the non-elderly. Few
previous studies have examined the factors that impact employer decision-making in selecting the
coverage to offer to their employees and none have examined generosity of mental health coverage.
This paper uses cross-sectional data from a survey of medium to large firms, including information
on employee characteristics, to examine the empirical determinants of mental health coverage
choices. We find that the firm's demand for mental health coverage is strongly influenced by
employee characteristics. We also find that certain state and local policy interventions directed at
enhancing access to mental health care have impacts on coverage decisions. Specifically, public
provision of mental health lowers mental health coverage generosity and parity legislation increases
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Employment-based health insurance is the main source of health care coverage 
for the non-elderly.  Currently, 61.3 percent of the under 65 population are covered 
through employer-provided policies (Denaus-Walt et al., 2003). Evidence from data over 
the past several decades also indicates that this coverage is usually fairly generous. Gabel 
et al. (2002) examine trends in generosity of health insurance benefits and find little 
variability in generosity with, on average, employees expecting to pay 25 percent of their 
expenditures out of pocket.  Bundorf (2002) develops plan generosity estimates from the 
1993 Robert Wood Johnson foundation employer survey.  Within each of four different 
categories of plans (HMO, POS, PPO and indemnity), she finds that the coefficient of 
variation of estimated plan value ranged from 0.68 to 0.125.  Moreover, her estimated 
plan value means are very similar across plan types, ranging from $1,133 to $1,220. 
The fairly uniform pattern of generous coverage (at least among employers who 
offer coverage) may not be surprising in light of the strong tax incentives for 
compensating workers via their health benefits (Sheils and Haught, 2004).  Some recent 
studies, however, suggest that this level of benefit generosity is beginning to trend 
downward in response to increasing premium cost pressures on employers (Strunk and 
Ginsburg, 2003). 
In the case of coverage specifically for mental health services, comparable 
national data on levels and trends of benefit generosity have not been produced, but the 
evidence that is available suggests the possibility that the burden of cost sharing is greater 
for persons with mental disorders and that increases in this burden may outpace 
comparable increases for health services in general. Using BLS data, Jensen et al. (1998)   2
find that 82 percent of firms provided less coverage for mental health inpatient services 
compared to general health services and that 98 percent provided less coverage for 
mental health outpatient services compared to general health.  In 2002, 74 percent of 
covered workers were subject to annual outpatient visit limits and 64 percent were 
subject to an annual inpatient day limit (Barry C et al., 2003).  State and Federal 
governments have responded to these differentials via enactment of so-called mental 
health “parity” laws, as well as laws mandating mental health benefits, though it is clear 
that these laws have not eliminated coverage differentials (U.S. General Accounting 
Office, 2000).  Anecdotal evidence suggests that in responding to cost pressures and 
premium increases, employers may look specifically to reductions in mental health 
benefits (Rosenheck et al., 1999).  At the national level, McKusick et al. (2002) simulate 
coverage under typical private health insurance plans in 1987 and 1995 and report that 
the share of mental health spending covered by the typical plan declined from 65.8 to 
60.1 percent.  
In the current economic climate, with most observers expecting further reductions 
in mental health coverage generosity, it is important that policy-makers understand the 
factors that impact on employer decision-making in selecting the coverage packages to 
offer to their employees.  Prior economic research on this question is sparse. Bundorf 
(2002) is the first to examine what factors may be associated with the overall health 
benefit generosity of employer sponsored insurance.  Supporting the presumption that 
employers seek to provide compensation packages that are most valued by their 
employees, she finds evidence of employee characteristics (specifically wage levels and a 
measure of variation in health risk) affecting the generosity of the health plan for firms   3
with 100 employees or less; however she finds no significant effect of employee 
characteristics on generosity for firms with greater than 100 employees. 
In this paper, we focus specifically on employer decisions about the generosity of 
the mental health benefits offered to their employees.  Following Bundorf (2002), our 
dependent variable is a measure of generosity averaged across all plans offered by the 
employer and explanatory variables include employee characteristics, as well as 
employer and area characteristics.  We also examine impacts of state-level policy 
measures (benefit mandates and parity laws) on benefit generosity.  The next section of 
the paper presents our conceptual approach to employers’ mental health benefit choices.  
The following sections describe our data sources and variables, and our estimation 
methods and results. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings 
and directions for future research. 
 
I.   Conceptual Approach 
 
The view that employer-sponsored health insurance should reflect the preferences 
of the employees has a long history in the health economics literature.  (For an early 
exposition, see Goldstein and Pauly, 1976).  Several recent papers (Dowd and Feldman 
1987; Bundorf 2002) have formalized this notion by assuming that employers choose the 
health insurance plans to offer by minimizing their compensation costs subject to a 
market-determined utility constraint for their workers.  We follow the same general 
approach here in modeling an employer’s mental health insurance coverage decision, but 
we also incorporate an extension suggested by earlier work on job safety (Rea, 1981)   4
which allows the characteristics of the insurance plan offered to impact on employers’ 
profits both through compensation costs (as in Dowd and Feldman and in Bundorf) and 
through effects on workers’ health. 
We model the employer’s mental health insurance decision as a short-run profit-
maximization problem (with capital inputs fixed) for a competitive firm.  The firm 
simultaneously chooses a quantity of labor to employ (L), a “wage” to pay (w), and a 
level of generosity of mental health coverage (G) to maximize the profit LaGrangian (H) 
which is defined as follows: 
 
(1) H = pQ a G () L {} −mGL−wL+ λ Ψ− aG () Vw () + 1−aG () Uw ,G () () { } [ ]
 
where  
p = price of product 
Q(⋅) = production function for output quantity 
a = probability of NO mental illness for the worker 
G= generosity of mental health benefit  
L= quantity of labor 
m= price per unit of generosity of the mental health benefit 
w= dollar cost of wages (and other benefits besides mental health coverage) 
Ψ = the firm’s labor market compensation constraint (in expected worker utility) 
V = worker’s utility function with no mental illness 
U = worker’s utility function with mental illness. 
   5
For simplicity, we assume (1) that workers are only in one of two possible health states 
(healthy or mentally ill), (2) that workers with mental illness do not work, and (3) that the 
employer’s workforce is large enough that her/his labor supply will be known with 
certainty to be aL. (The labor-market constraint assumes that workers are expected utility 






















Condition (2) is a direct analog of the standard condition for profit maximization 
of a competitive firm.  Condition (3) indicates that the firm chooses a benefit generosity 
level such that the marginal cost of an additional increment of generosity (Lm) is just 
equal to the marginal revenue product of an additional increment of generosity plus the 
effect of that increment on workers’ expected utility multiplied by λ, which is the 
marginal effect on profit of a change in the expected-utility (market) constraint.  
Condition (4) shows that wages are set at the point where the marginal cost of an 
increment to the wage, L, equals the effect of that increment on workers’ expected utility   6
multiplied by λ.  Since an increase in wages increases workers’ expected utility, λ must 
be negative; in other words, a one-unit increase in the level of the expected utility (labor 
market) constraint reduces profit by λ. 
Also note that when condition (3) is divided by condition (4), we find that the 
ratio of marginal expected utility for an extra unit of coverage (G) to that for an extra 
dollar of wage is equal to (m - pQLaG).  In comparison, if w and G were chosen to 
maximize worker expected utility subject to a budget constraint of B = w + mG, the 
corresponding ratio would be equal to m.  Thus, in this model the firm has a stronger 
incentive to purchase generous coverage to obtain the marginal revenue product of lower 
disability rates among its workforce.
1 
Several simple extensions of the model provide direct links with some current 
policy concerns.  One is the inclusion of the tax preference for benefits, which would 
imply changing the wage argument in the workers’ utility functions to (1-t)w, where t is 
the marginal tax rate.  A second is inclusion of a parameter, z, representing the influence 
of G on the adverse selection costs to the employer of attracting a workforce with greater 
demand for mental health care as G increases.  This adverse selection process would 
imply that the benefit price (m) should be an increasing function of G (with the rate of 
increase depending on z) and that the influence of G on the probability of disability 
would also depend upon z.  As will be noted later, such adverse selection effects may be 
                                                 
1 In the polar case where mental health coverage has no effect in reducing the probability 
of disability, employee expected utility maximization conditions apply and the 
employer’s choice reduces to the cost-minimization framework as in Bundorf (2002). For 
evidence of coverage effects on disability rates, see Salkever et al. (2000, 2003).  Also 
note that in our model if workers’ incomes in the disabled state are reduced to Ω⋅w 
(where 0 ≤ Ω < 1), the relevant ratio becomes {m – [pQ-(1-Ω)w]aG}. 
   7
particularly relevant for understanding the ways in which parity legislation impacts on the 
employer’s choice of G.  
The foregoing discussion of the model indicates that the employer’s optimal 
choice of G should depend upon the following exogenous factors: the prevailing market 
price of her/his product (p), the prevailing compensation constraint for her/his workers 
(Ψ), tax rates, the price (m) of each unit of G, risk factors that influence the marginal 
effect of G on the probability of mental illness, and worker characteristics that influence 
their productivity and their preferences in both the no-mental-illness and mentally-ill 
states. 
 
II.  Data Sources and Study Sample of Employers 
 
The primary data source for this research is a survey of employer practices 
regarding benefits and disability management that was conducted in 1996 by the 
Department of Health Policy and Management of The Johns Hopkins University.  In 
cooperation with a private disability insurer, a survey target population of 1,433 
employers was identified based on the following criteria: 1) having an active long-term 
disability policy with this insurer over the past three years and 2) having at least 300 
covered lives on the LTD policy at some time during that three-year period. 
These employers received a mailed questionnaire as well as up to two follow-up 
calls to encourage responses and to answer any questions about the survey.  Besides the 
mailed survey, firms were asked to send summary plan descriptions or a detailed plan 
abstract form (nine firms sent abstract forms) for each health plan offered to their   8
employees.  Data were obtained on 577 health plans offered by 250 employers.  (An 
additional 28 firms responded in the survey that they offered health plans but did not 
provide the detailed information we requested on these plans.)  This health plan data was 
abstracted and used for our analyses.
2  More detailed descriptions of the survey data are 
provided in Salkever et al. (1999). 
Additional variables, defined for the geographic location of each employer and for 
their industry (SIC) category, were obtained from public sources noted below.  
Additional data on employee characteristics for those employees who are covered by the 
employer’s long-term disability (LTD) plan were obtained from the private insurer’s 
administrative data files.
3 
Characteristics of the employers in our study sample (unweighted means averaged 
across employers) are presented in Table 1.  While all regions of the country are 
represented, the largest numbers of employers are located in the East North Central 
region (24.8 percent) and the Middle Atlantic region (17.2 percent).  Over half (57.2 
percent) of the employers have employees located in more than one state and 38.8 
percent have locations in four or more states.  Most of the employers are in either the 
services (47.2 percent) or manufacturing (24.8 percent) sectors.  Among the 91 percent of 
                                                 
2 Since the overall response rate was low (17 percent), as is often the case in employer 
mail surveys (Jensen and Gabel, 1992; Freeman and Kleiner, 2000), we have carefully 
analyzed administrative data on respondents and nonrespondents for evidence of 
respondent bias. Our analysis (available from the authors) consistently supports the null 
hypothesis of no respondent bias. 
 
3 While some employees are not covered by the LTD benefit, the median for the ratio of 
the total lives covered under LTD to the total number of employees reported on the 
survey is 0.90.  Thus, the characteristics of LTD covered employees should provide a 
close approximation to the firm's overall employee characteristics. 
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employers who report their distribution of employees by salaried versus hourly status, 
53.7 percent of employees are salaried.  Union employees are present in 26 percent of the 
firms. 
Responding employers are mainly medium-sized or large: the mean number of 
employees is 1,776 and the median is 773.  Given their size, and the fact that all offer 
LTD benefits to at least some of their employees, it is not surprising that their other 
benefit offerings are generous.  For example, 89.6 percent of employers offer retirement 
benefits, and the mean total days offered for sick and paid vacation leave is 21.5 days per 
year.  Employment-based health insurance coverage is offered by all of the employers.  
(This also applies to the 28 employers who responded to our survey but did not provide 
detailed information on the health benefits available to their employees.)  The employers 
pay, on average, approximately 82 percent of the health insurance premium
4 and 23.6 
percent of employers pay the entire health insurance premium.  
 
III.  Specification of Variables 
 
 
  Dependent Variables: Our measures of mental health coverage generosity are 
summary variables that incorporate various specific features of coverage such as 
copayments, coinsurance, deductibles, and expenditure and utilization limits.  
Information on the characteristics of each health plan offered by a firm is obtained from 
the summary plan descriptions or detailed abstraction forms each firm provided.
5  The 
                                                 
4 Approximately 9 percent of respondents did not respond to this survey question. 
 
5 Descriptions of the mental health coverage features under these various health insurance 
plans are reported elsewhere (Salkever et al., 1999).  The Salkever et al. (1999) study   10
generosity measures are first constructed at the health plan level and then averaged over 
all health plans the firm offers to obtain a firm level measure. 
In order to summarize the generosity of health plans offered by the firm, variables 
representing the dollar amount of benefits covered are constructed by combining plan-
specific data with simulated utilization data.  Since we do not have actual health plan 
enrollment or claims history data, we use distributional parameters from the literature to 
simulate the utilization of a covered population and apply the resulting simulated data to 
the benefit structure for each health plan offered by the firm.  The process simulates the 
utilization patterns for mental health inpatient days and outpatient visits.
6  A total of 
100,000 random draws is simulated. 
Prices for each service are added to create our simulated expenditure data.  All 
prices are for the year 1995.  The inpatient price per day is obtained from Leslie and 
Rosenheck (1998, Table 2) and the outpatient price per visit is from a price list of a large 
managed behavioral health care provider.  
Information on health plan coverage provisions obtained from employers is 
combined with the simulated utilization data and expenditures to determine the amount of 
out-of-pocket expenditures for each random “person” for each service.  The health plan 
coverage provisions incorporated into the simulation are: deductibles including mental 
health and/or inpatient specific deductibles, copayment amounts, coinsurance rates, 
annual limits on mental health inpatient days or outpatient visits, annual benefit limits for 
                                                                                                                                                 
reported that in general, the HMO plans in this data are more likely to use day and visit 
limits than the non-HMO plans. 
 
6 Distributional parameters are obtained from Goldman et al, 1998 and Sturm 1997.  See 
Shinogle, 2001 for complete details of these calculations.   11
mental health or a specific mental health service such as outpatient or inpatient, per 
admission copayments, out-of-pocket expenditure limits, and scope of out-of-pocket 
expenditure limits (e.g. mental-health specific limits vs. overall limits).  
The generosity indicators for each plan are computed as one minus the ratio of the 
mean simulated out-of-pocket expenditure to the mean simulated total expenditures for 
each service category (outpatient, inpatient, total).  The unweighted averages of plan 
generosity are then computed among all plans offered by an employer.
7  
The means and standard deviations for the mental health generosity measures are 
presented in Table 2.  The percent of total mental health expenditures covered (MHCOV) 
range from zero (no coverage) to 100 (complete coverage) with an average of 62.01 
percent of total simulated mental health expenditures covered.  The average coverage of 
outpatient mental health expenditures (MHOPCOV) is 62.11 percent and the average 
coverage of inpatient mental health (MHIPCOV) is 60.92.  Table 2 also presents the 
medians of the mental health generosity measures, which are almost identical to the 
means.
8  The last two columns of the table report the number of cases with either zero or 
full coverage for each of the three measures. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
7 Note that we assume the same distribution of utilization and expenditures for all plans.  
Thus we abstract from moral hazard considerations in computing our generosity 
measures. 
 
8 Salkever and Shinogle (2000) present information on the generosity of the health plan 
benefits by health plan type.  This study found that preferred provider organization 
(PPOs) have a higher simulated coverage of total and outpatient mental health coverage 
than fee-for-service (FFS) plans and a higher simulated inpatient mental health coverage 
than heath maintenance organizations (HMO) plans.  FFS plans in this data have higher 
simulated inpatient mental health coverage than HMO plans but HMO plans have higher 
outpatient mental health coverage than FFS plans.   12
The descriptions and data sources for all explanatory variables used in the 
analysis are presented in Table 3; the corresponding means and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 4.  Employer characteristics such as dummies for the total number of 
employees, a 0-1 dummy for the presence of any union employees (UNION), and the 
percent of employees who are salaried (PCTSAL) are obtained from the employer survey 
described above.  Note that we include dummies for the employer size categories (based 
on numbers of employees) rather than the exact number of employees since the number 
of employees is a choice variable in our conceptual model and therefore arguably 
endogenous.  At the same time, we expect that factors such as economies of scale in 
benefits provision and the feasibility of self-insurance are strongly related to numbers of 
employees; the employer size dummies are intended to control for these factors while 
being less susceptible to endogeneity bias.
9  Since detailed information on employees’ 
education levels and specific job types are lacking in our data base but are potentially 
important predictors of employee preferences with regard to benefits, the percent of 
salaried employees (PCTSAL) is included to control for these preferences. (Since 25 
employers did not provide information on the number of salaried employees, the 
PCTSAL variable is coded as zero for these employers and a dummy variable 
(MISS_SAL) is created that is equal to one if salaried employee information is missing.)   
  Characteristics of employees who are covered under the firm’s LTD insurance 
benefit are obtained from administrative data collected by the insurer.   This 
                                                 
9 Note that seventeen employers failed to report their total number of employees in the 
survey.  To include these respondents in the analysis, information on their number of 
employees was obtained from 1996 Dunn and Bradstreet Information Services data, from 
employer web sites, or from regional economic web sites (e.g., the Greater Toledo 
Regional Growth Partnership, http:\\www.rgp.org).   13
administrative data is available for all 1,433 firms in the sample universe.  As noted 
above, not all employees are covered by the LTD benefit, but the median for the ratio of 
the total lives covered under LTD benefit to the total number of employees reported on 
the survey is 0.90.  Thus, the characteristics of LTD covered employees should provide a 
close approximation to the firm’s overall employee characteristics.  This administrative 
data contains employee characteristics such as the percent of employees covered under 
the firm’s LTD benefit that are: 1) female (FEMALE), 2) age 35 years old or younger 
(AGE ≤35), and 3) age 50 and older (AGE50+).  These data also describe the distribution 
of the firm’s employees among four different occupational categories: white collar 
(OCCWC), skilled blue-collar (OCCBL), unskilled (OCCU), and semi-skilled.
10 
  To measure the tightness of the local labor market, data on the 1995 state 
unemployment rate (UNEMP) is acquired from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics 
on the U.S Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) web site (www.bls.gov).   This variable is 
matched to employers by the address of the main company headquarters. 
  As a proxy for the market compensation constraint, we construct a measure of 
total compensation per employee (TOT_COMP) from administrative data on the median 
salary for LTD covered employees, from survey data on the generosity of health 
insurance benefits offered by the firm, and from information on retirement benefits 
offered by the firm.  The dollar value of health coverage is computed as the product of 1) 
the simulated percentage of general plus mental health expenditures covered on average 
                                                 
10 For firms with incomplete administrative data, missing information on employee 
characteristics is imputed using data from all employers in the sample universe that 
reported complete information (See Salkever et al., 2000 for more information on this 
imputation). 
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by the plans offered by the employer, 2) the percentage of the health plan cost paid by the 
employer, and 3) the mean per capita spending for physicians, hospitals, drugs, and other 
health professionals by persons with active employer-sponsored health insurance as 
calculated from the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey.
11  The cost of retirement 
benefits is computed as the product of 1) a dummy variable for firms offering retirement 
benefits, 2) the firm’s median salary, and 3) the estimated cost (in percentage terms) of 
retirement benefits. The last term is calculated based on the Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC)-category-specific percentage of compensation going to retirement 
benefits as reported in the BLS Employment Cost Index (ECI), and the state-and-SIC-
specific percentage of employees reporting the receipt of retirement benefits in the April 
1993 CPS.
12 
  It is hypothesized (Dowd and Feldman, 1987) that risk of illness should increase 
the demand for coverage.  The only available risk factor that could be used in this study is 
the percent of employees with heavy alcohol consumption (HEAVY_ALC) in the 
industry of the employer (Hoffman et al. 1997). 
The marginal tax rate (MTR) is calculated using 1994 state and federal rates and 
tax laws compiled by the Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR, 
                                                 
11  The method for simulating the generosity (i.e., percent coverage) of non-mental health 
expenditures is analogous to that used for simulating mental health coverage generosity.  
Further details are available from the authors. 
 
 
12 The CPS data are used to adjust for the fact that the compensation cost percentages in 
the ECI data are for all firms rather than just for firms providing retirement benefits. 
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1995).  The rate is based on the median income for full-time workers in 1994 
(www.bls.gov).  The rate is calculated assuming a standard deduction.   
  Local health care and mental health care market characteristics pertain to the 
health maintenance organizations (HMO) enrollment, expenditures on mental health 
specialty services, and the area costs to Medicare.  The 1995 per capita enrollment in 
health maintenance organizations (HMO) is obtained from the Area Resource File 
produced by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  This county level 
measure is summed over the state and divided by state population to obtain state level per 
capita HMO enrollment.  Greater availability of HMO plans in the local market is 
expected to be positively related to coverage generosity in that HMOs can presumably 
offer more effective control of moral hazard costs arising from generous benefits relative 
to PPO or traditional fee-for-service plans.  We note, however, that simple descriptive 
comparisons of plan types do not show that HMOs provide more generous coverage on 
average and also show that HMOs tend to make more use of various benefit limitations 
(Salkever and Shinogle, 2000; Salkever et al., 1999). 
  To measure the importance of publicly funded mental health services in the state, 
the percent of the mental health specialty expenditures (primarily for clinics and 
hospitals) accounted for by public facilities is computed (PCTPUBEXP) from the 1994 
Inventory of Mental Health Organizations Survey data (Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health Services Administration, 1995).
13  Since no state level measure of price for mental 
health treatment is available, the 1996 local costs to Medicare (AAPCC) for health care 
                                                 
13 The public facilities included state, regional, county, and other public mental health 
facilities but excluded Veterans Administration or Tribal facilities. 
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services for the elderly are used.  This measure reflects the price of health care services as 
well as the average level of use of these services by Medicare beneficiaries. 
  State laws relating to 1) mental health benefits parity, 2) substance abuse 
treatment and mental health treatment coverage mandates, and 3) premium taxes are 
obtained from several sources.   For each of the three types of laws, two variables are 
included in the analysis: a 0 -1 dummy variable for firms located in states with the law in 
effect in 1995 or earlier, and an interaction dummy which equaled one if the firm had less 
than 1000 employees and the firm was located in a state with the specific benefit law in 
effect.  (The interacted variables are labeled with an "_EMP" extension (MAN_EMP, 
PAR_EMP, and PREM_EMP).)  Firm size is included in the interaction variables since 
state insurance laws are not applicable to firms who self-insure.  Our data contain no 
information on the insured versus self-insured status of the health plan; thus we use firm 
size as a proxy measure for self-insurance.
14  To determine if the firm is located in a state 
that had a mental health parity law in effect in 1995 (PARITY), information is obtained 
from the National Institutes of Mental Health Parity Report (National Institutes of Mental 
Health, 1998).  For this analysis, only states with a full parity law are coded as having 
parity.  Information on states mandating coverage of mental health, alcohol abuse 
treatment, and/or drug abuse treatment benefits were obtained from the National 
Conference of State Legislators Health Tracking service (www.ncsl.org) as well as a 
recent General Accounting Office report (U.S. GAO, 2000).  (Laws mandating only the 
                                                 
14 Uccello (1996) finds that for firms with 1000 or more employees, 75 percent are self-
insured; for firms with 500 to 999 employees, 46 percent are self-insured; for firms with 
250 to 499 employees, 49 percent are self-insured; for firms with 100 to 249 employees, 
27 percent are self insured and for firms with less than 100 employees approximately 10 
percent are self-insured.   17
offer of optional coverage are not considered.)  If the firm was in a state that mandated all 
three benefits (mental health, alcohol abuse, and drug abuse treatment) then the mandate 
(MANDATE) variable is coded as one.  State health insurance premium taxes vary with 
the type of insurance product (HMO, Blue Cross and Blue Shield, or other private 
insurance).  The information on state health insurance premium taxes is derived from a 
U.S. General Accounting Office Report (U.S. GAO, 1996).  For our premium tax measure, we 
use the maximum tax rate for any health insurance product within the state (PREMTAX). 
 
IV.   Estimation Methods 
 
Since our dependent variables have upper and lower limits (of no coverage and 
full coverage), we use a two-limit Tobit regression approach.  Results are reported for the 
full model; to assess the stability of our strongest results to inclusion or exclusion of 
explanatory variables with non-significant coefficients, we also report results obtained 
when insignificant variables are selectivity removed in a backward selection process with 
an exclusion criterion of p > 0.3. 
15 
Since our total compensation constraint measure is based on firm-specific data 
and uses our dependent variable (MHCOV) as one of the elements in its construction, it is 
reasonable to consider the possibility that the coefficient for this variable is subject to 
simultaneity bias.
16 Accordingly, we re-estimate our full models using Amemiya’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
15 In addition, we replicated our Tobit results using the GLM approach suggested by 
Mullahy (2003) and by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). We also estimated linear OLS 
models. Findings are virtually identical to those reported here. 
 
16 In relative terms, however, MHCOV accounts for only 0.003 percent of TOT_COMP 
since mental health spending is only about 4 percent of total health spending. 
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Generalized Least-Squares method for simultaneous equation Tobit models (Amemiya, 
1979; Newey, 1987) and include two additional variables as instruments.  These are the 
population density in the county where the employer is located or headquartered 
(DENSITY) and a dummy variable for firms that experience a layoff that changed the 
number of employees by more than 15 percent in the five years preceding the survey 
(ANYLAYOFF).
17  
V.   Results 
 
  Results of regressions on the overall (outpatient plus inpatient) generosity 
measure (MHCOV) are reported in Table 5.  Columns 1 through 4 present the results 
with the occupation group variables included.  Since we presume that these variables are 
strongly correlated with our market compensation constraint variable (TOTCOMP), we 
estimate our models both with and without these variables.  Results obtained when they 
are excluded are shown in Columns 5 through 8.  As a group, variables relating to 
employee characteristics are found to exert a strong influence on the generosity of mental 
health benefits.  Percent female is a strong positive predictor of generosity and the 
industry-level risk-factor variable (HEAVYALC) also has a significantly positive 
coefficient.  The fraction of total employees who are salaried is a positive predictor of 
generosity up to approximately 68 percent, beyond which further increases in percent 
salaried reduce generosity.  If salaried workers generally have higher levels of education, 
we might expect a positive relationship of PCTSAL to generosity throughout the 0 to 100 
percent range based on the empirical literature on demand for mental health services 
                                                 
17 Analogous linear IV models were also estimated since the numbers of limit dependent 
variable observations in our data were small. Here again the results were essentially the 
same as for the Tobit models. 
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(Newhouse JP, 1993).  The reasons for our finding of a more pronounced downturn at 
higher levels of PCTSAL are unclear.
18  Results for the variables describing the 
occupational mix of employees are not quite as strong, but there is some support for the 
expectation that workers in white-collar jobs (OCCWC) and skilled blue-collar jobs 
(OCCBL) have a stronger demand for generous mental health coverage. 
  Results for the firm size dummies indicate a positive effect on generosity as the 
employee pool increases from under 500 to over 500 employees and from under 2000 to 
over 2000 employees; a positive effect over the range from 500 to 2000 is not observed. 
The presence of unions per se does not appear to affect generosity while the per capita 
HMO enrollment rate in the state is a strongly negative predictor of generosity. 
  A number of the variables typically found in economic models of insurance 
demand do not have significant coefficients in our regressions. These include the 
marginal tax rate (MTR), the premium tax rate (PREMTAX), and our proxy for the price 
per unit of generosity (AAPCC). The tightness of the local labor market, as measured by 
UNEMP, is also not significant. The market compensation variable (TOT_COMP) is 
weakly positive; since some previous studies (e.g., Wells et al., 1986; Taube et al. 1986) 
have reported positive relationships between income and mental health utilization or 
expenditures, we suspect that the weakness of our result may be at least partly due to 
measurement errors in this variable. 
  Finally, several results for variables relating to public policies are of interest. The 
strongly negative coefficients for PCTPUBEXP indicate a crowding out of private 
                                                 
18 One might speculate that the strength of adverse selection also is stronger for salaried 
employees and that this tends to cause a decline in average generosity of coverage as the 
percent of salaried workers increases, offsetting other positive effects. 
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coverage by public spending. The magnitude of this effect is fairly small however; a 10 
percent increase in PCTPUBEXP predicts a reduction of about 1 percent in mental health 
coverage.  State legislation of benefit mandates does not show any effect on coverage but 
we do observe a large and strongly positive effect of parity laws on coverage generosity 
for firms with less than 1,000 employees.  A reasonable interpretation of this result is that 
state parity laws have diminished problems with adverse selection by excluding plans 
with minimal mental health coverage from the underwritten portion of the market.  Self-
insured firms, which are typically larger, are not affected directly by these parity laws and 
our results suggest that there are minimal spill-over indirect effects on their coverage 
decisions. 
  Analogous regression results for outpatient coverage generosity (MHOPCOV) are 
reported in Table 6.  For the most part, these results closely parallel the findings for total 
mental health coverage. Evidence for the crowd-out effect of public expenditures and for 
the impact of parity on smaller firms is slightly stronger.  
  In the regression results for inpatient coverage generosity (MHIPCOV) in Table 
7, we find that a smaller number of our explanatory variables are significant.  Firm size 
effects do not occur above 500 employees. AAPCC has a strongly positive coefficient but 
this may be primarily due to inter-area variations in utilization (rather than prices) since 
areas where general hospitalization use is high may also display greater hospitalization 
use for mental health treatments. The positive effect of PCTSAL does not diminish at 
higher values.
19  Apart from the industry-level risk factor (HEAVYALC), employee 
                                                 
19 If inpatient coverage is less affected by adverse selection, this finding would be 
consistent with our earlier speculation (in Note 18). 
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characteristics do not appear to exert a strong influence on observed demand for inpatient 
coverage.  Results for our policy variables are also rather different than in Tables 5 and 6. 
Coverage mandates appear to have a negative effect for all firms regardless of size and 
parity laws have a positive effect for all firms.  Public-sector spending does not appear to 
crowd out private coverage for inpatient treatment.  Finally, the results for UNEMP do 
show some evidence of a negative relationship between labor-market slack and inpatient 
coverage. 
  Instrumental variable results with total compensation treated as endogenous are 
reported in Appendix Tables 1-3. The IV estimates are generally quite close to the simple 
Tobit results but a few differences are noteworthy.  First, the positive effect of 
TOT_COMP on insurance demand is somewhat stronger in the IV results, particularly in 
the total and outpatient generosity regressions when other non-significant variables are 
deleted from the models.
20  These coefficient estimates suggest a coverage demand 
elasticity, evaluated at mean values, of approximately 0.15.  Second, the parity effect for 
smaller firms is somewhat weaker in the IV models when all explanatory variables are 
included; exclusion of non-significant explanatory variables yields results that are more 
similar to the simple Tobit estimates.  Finally, we test for overidentification by re-
estimating our models as standard linear IV regressions and computing Basmann’s 
(1960) test statistic.  We generally fail to reject our null hypothesis with p-values ranging 
from 0.166 to 0.387.  The only exception is the inpatient coverage regressions with the 
occupational variables excluded (Columns 5 and 6). 
                                                 
20 Note that in the IV regressions with non-significant variables deleted, these variables 
were retained as instruments. 
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     VI.  Discussion 
 
The demand for mental health coverage under employer-sponsored health 
insurance is strongly driven by employee characteristics.  Our results show a strong 
positive demand effect for the firm-level percent of workers who are female and percent 
of salaried workers, and the industry-level percent of employees with heavy alcohol 
consumption.  Our results are similar to Bundorf’s (2002) small-firm results in that she 
finds a positive effect for the variation in worker characteristics (measured through a 
health risk variable that includes demographic information) on choice of plan and plan 
generosity. Our gender result also accords with the finding of Long and Scott (1982) that 
the percent of total employment that is female has a significantly positive effect on the 
percent of compensation received as health insurance. 
As in Bundorf’s (2002) small-firm results, we also find some support for the 
hypothesis that the income or total compensation effect is positive.  Our results are not, 
however, very strong.  Future research should further examine the effects of area 
compensation on health plan generosity. 
We find other economic factors, such as labor market tightness, premium taxes 
and marginal income tax rates, to be weak predictors of mental health coverage 
generosity.  These variables have had mixed effects in previous studies.  Gruber and 
Lettau (2004) find significant marginal tax effects on health insurance offering, but their 
results are also driven by smaller establishment data (<100 employees).  Similarly, 
Leibowitz and Chernew (1992) find tax rates significantly associated with firms offering 
health insurance but only for firms with less than 50 employees.     23
State benefit mandates do not appear to lower the fraction of total and outpatient 
mental health expenditures covered but are negative predictors of the fraction of inpatient 
mental health expenditures covered.  On the other hand, state mental health parity laws 
significantly increase the fraction of mental health expenditures covered for smaller 
firms.  This supports the concept that the parity laws may lower the potential adverse 
selection effects.  This could lower the marginal benefit costs of more generous coverage.  
Other direct evidence on this finding is limited; Bao and Sturm (2004) found little effect 
of parity on employee’s perceived quality of health insurance coverage, perceived access 
or use of specialty services.  To the extent that parity simultaneously increases coverage 
generosity and the use of utilization management mechanisms, the two findings could be 
consistent.  
  Finally, the lower coverage of mental health (total and outpatient) expenditures 
for firms located in states where the public facilities account for a higher percentage of 
the total mental health specialty expenditures supports the expectation of crowding out of 
private benefits by public services.  This is consistent with a recent finding of crowd-out 
effects for public hospital facilities on individual’s private insurance coverage status 
reported by Rask and Rask (2000).  Other recent crowd-out estimates of public insurance 
programs (such as Medicaid) on employer offers of health insurance have reported 
similar results. Marquis and Long (2003) find a substitution between the employer offer 
of health insurance and pubic coverage of children during the Medicaid expansions. 
Shore-Shepard et al. (2000) find no effect of the expansion on employer offers of 
insurance, but they did find a significant decline in coverage generosity measured as   24
offering family coverage and employees’ share of premiums (both single and family 
coverage).  
  While we believe that a strength of this study is in its bringing together of 
employer-level data on mental health benefit offerings and data on employee 
characteristics, the reader should note several important limitations in these data.  First, 
the cross-sectional nature of the data suggests the need for caution in drawing causal 
inferences about policy variables.  In particular, it is possible that omitted state-specific 
population characteristics which influence the adoption of mandate and parity laws, or 
the provision of publicly funded mental health services, may also be related to 
employees’ preferences for insurance coverage.  Panel data are clearly needed to control 
for these omitted state characteristics and to provide more definitive estimates of impacts 
for these factors.   
Second, the generalizability of our results to a broader universe of firms may be 
problematic. Since only 17 percent of surveyed firms responded to our detailed 
questionnaire, there is clearly some potential for response bias, though our tests have 
failed to detect it. (See Salkever et al., 2000 and 2003; additional information is available 
from the authors.)  A more serious concern arises from the fact that our sample of firms 
was drawn from a list of firm's that offer employees long-term disability insurance 
coverage.  These firms are presumably larger and offer a richer fringe benefit package 
than a representative sample of all U.S. firms. Comparing our firms to establishments 
who cover long-term disability insurance from the 1993 National Employer Health 
Insurance Survey finds a similar geographic distribution and similar firm size.    25
  One other data deficiency, which of course is common to most studies, is gaps in 
available data on explanatory variables.  Given the focus of this analysis, it would clearly 
be desirable to have more information on employee characteristics such as education that 
could be expected to influence demand for coverage.  Our area total compensation 
variable is also incomplete; important parts of the compensation package such as short-
term and long-term disability insurance, are not valued due to the lack of data while 
national averages (rather than firm-specific data) are used in several parts of our method 
for constructing this variable. 
    
  VII.   Conclusions and Future Directions 
 
ThIs study provides some additional empirical support for the long-standing 
proposition in the economic literature that demand for employer-provided health 
insurance is derived from the preferences and characteristics of the covered employees.  
While the previous empirical support for this proposition has come from results for small 
firms, our results pertain primarily to medium-size and larger firms. Of course, the 
support we provide is somewhat qualified in that some of our employee characteristics 
variables are not significant predictors or displayed unexpected patterns of influence (as 
in the case of the percent of workers who are salaried).  Further testing of this general 
proposition is certainly warranted, perhaps including a more detailed examination of the 
differences between small and large firm results reported in previous studies.   
One could also view the consistency of our results with earlier studies as 
supporting the view that demand for mental health coverage generally responds to the   26
same incentives and factors as demand for general health coverage.  We do, however, 
find that some policy interventions directed at enhancing access to mental health care 
(specifically public provision and parity legislation) do impact on coverage decisions.  As 
noted above, further testing of these policy impacts with panel data sets is clearly needed. 
  The comparison of the simple conceptual model that we use to motivate our 
empirical research with the compensation-cost-minimizing models described in previous 
studies also raises some interesting questions for future investigation.  While the latter 
model focuses on employee preferences and utility, the recent literatures on the cost of 
mental disorders in the workplace to employers (Goetzel et al. 2003; Goldberg and 
Steury, 2001; Goetzel et al. 1998; Kessler and Frank, 1997) and the effectiveness of 
interventions to prevent or treat these disorders (Goetzel et al.  2002);  implies that the 
employers may also have a direct interest in the mental health coverage decision.
21  If 
empirical indicators that may relate to employer costs can be developed (e.g., amount of 
firm-specific human capital, the prevalence of team production methods), their inclusion 
in models of coverage demand would provide an empirical test of the view that both 
employers and employees have distinct stakes in this decision. 
  Finally, extension of this research with more recent data should expand its scope 
by including information about drug coverage.  Pharmacotherapies are now a critical 
element in the treatment of mental disorders, and studies of insurance coverage for the 
costs of treating these disorders must recognize this fact.   
 
                                                 
21 A similar point about employer benefits from employee health coverage has been 
noted, in a somewhat different context, by Dey and Flinn (2005). 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Employers in the Study Sample (N=250) 
Region  Percent   Firm Characteristics Percent
East North Central 24.80% Percent with union employees  26.00%
East South Central 2.40% Total employees, mean  1776
Middle Atlantic 17.60% Total employees, median  773
Mountain 4.80% Benefits Characteristics 
New England 4.00% Percent of firms that offer 
retirement benefits 
89.60%
Pacific 12.00% Total leave, mean days  21.5
South Atlantic 17.20% % of health insurance 
premium employer pays 
81.90%
West North Central 8.40% % of firms that pay entire 
health insurance premium 
23.60%
West South Central 8.80% Employee Characteristics 
Industry  % of workforce that is 
salaried 
53.70%
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 14.40% % with any union employees  26.0%
Manufacturing 24.80% % workforce in unions for 
firms with union employees 
43.4%
Services 47.20%  
Retail/Wholesale Trade 5.60%  
Other 8.00%  
 
 
Table 2: Dependent Variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
Definition Mean  Std. 
Dev. 




MHCOV  % simulated total mental health 
expenditures covered 
62.01 %  0.1353 61.63 %  2  1 
MHOPCOV % simulated outpatient mental 
health expenditures covered 
62.11 %  0.1411 61.95 %  2  1 
MHIPCOV  % simulated inpatient mental 
health expenditures covered 
60.92 %  0.2167 58.58 %  2  15 
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Table 3: Explanatory Variable Names, Definitions and Sources 
Variable Definition  Source 
PCTSAL  Percent of salaried workers  Survey 
SQPCTSAL  Percent of salaried workers – squared  Survey 
MISS_SAL  =1 if  percent salaried unknown  Survey 
HEAVYALC  Percent of employees with heavy alcohol consumption in 
the firm's industry 
SAMHSA 
Report 
EMP 2, EMP3, 
EMP4 
Dummies for > = 500, > = 1000, >=2000 total employees 
respectively 
Survey 
UNION  = 1 if firm has union employees  Survey 
HMO  HMO enrollment per capita by state, 1995  Area 
Resource File
MANDATE  = 1 if firm located in a state with alcohol abuse, drug abuse 
and mental health treatment coverage mandates in 1995 
GAO Reports
MAND_EMP  = 1 if MANDATE=1 and EMP3 = 0 (< 1000 employees)  GAO Reports
PARITY  = 1 if firm located in a state with mental health parity law 
in 1995 
GAO Reports
PAR_EMP  = 1 if  PARITY =1 and EMP3 = 0  GAO Reports
UNEMP  State unemployment rate, 1995  BLS website 
MTR  Marginal tax rate, 1994  ACIR Report
MULT  Firm has employees in four or more states  Survey 
PCTPUBEXP  Percent of specialty mental health expenditures in the state 
that are publicly funded 
IMHO Survey
PREMTAX  Maximum state premium tax  GAO Reports
PREM_EMP  = Maximum state premium tax if EMP <1000  GAO Reports
TOT_COMP  Total compensation per employee (median salary + cost of 
health insurance plus cost of retirement benefits) 
Admin. Data, 
BLS, CPS 
FEMALE  Percent of LTD covered workers who are female  Admin. Data 
AGE < =35  Percent of LTD covered workers who are age 35 or less  Admin. Data 
AGE > 49  Percent of LTD covered workers who are age 50 or greater Admin. Data 
OCCWC  Percent of LTD covered workers who are white-collar  Admin. Data 
OCCBL  Percent of LTD covered workers who are skilled blue-
collar 
Admin. Data 
OCCU  Percent of LTD covered workers who are unskilled  Admin. Data 
AAPCC  Average Adjusted Per Capita Costs for Medicare elderly 
by county in 1996  
HCFA 
Website 
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Table 4: Explanatory Variable Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev  Variable  Mean  Std. Dev 
PCTSAL 0.4856  0.3318 MTR  0.2006  0.0284
SQPCTSAL 0.3454  0.3602 MULT  0.3880  0.4883
MISS_SAL 0.0960  0.2952 PCTPUBEXP  0.1933  0.1728
HEAVYALC 5.8928  2.8665 PREMTAX 0.9480  0.2225
EMP2 (>=500)  0.716  0.4518 PREM_EMP  0.5560  0.4979
EMP3 (>=1000)  0.416  0.4939 TOT_COMP     $32,976    $12,297 
EMP4 (>=2000)  0.256  0.4373 FEMALE  0.5193  0.2088
UNION 0.2600  0.4395 AGE  <=35    0.3586  0.1312
HMO  0.2021  0.1009 AGE > 49  0.1840  0.0860
MANDATE 0.1240  0.3302 OCCWC  0.8116  0.2022
MAND_EMP 0.0720  0.2590 OCCBL  0.0603  0.1142
PARITY 0.0800  0.2718 OCCU 0.0443  0.0684
PAR_EMP 0.0440  0.2055 AAPCC $392.74  $75.59
UNEMP 5.5244  1.1927  
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Table 5: Tobit Regression results for  Total Mental Health Coverage (MHCOV) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Coeff. P>|t| Coeff. P>|t| Coeff.  P>|t|  Coeff.  P>|t| 
PCTSAL 0.372  0.010  0.346 0.013 0.333 0.017  0.336 0.014
SQPCTSAL -0.275  0.021  -0.246 0.034 -0.247 0.034  -0.247 0.033
MISS_SAL 0.122  0.006  0.125 0.004 0.114 0.008  0.116 0.006
EMP2 0.031  0.147  0.034 0.100 0.035 0.092  0.037 0.070
EMP3 -0.012  0.815  -0.008 0.880 
EMP4 0.042  0.102  0.044 0.055 0.040 0.115  0.041 0.075
HEAVYALC 0.007  0.035  0.007 0.021 0.007 0.037  0.007 0.032
UNION -0.022  0.273  -0.021 0.283  -0.021 0.286
HMO -0.208  0.055  -0.254 0.003 -0.207 0.057  -0.207 0.024
MANDATE 0.029  0.555  0.025 0.610 
MAND_EMP -0.019  0.755  -0.016 0.785 
PARITY 0.023  0.690  0.026 0.643 
PAR_EMP 0.136  0.063  0.172 0.000 0.133 0.070  0.154 0.000
MTR -0.340  0.301  -0.300 0.360 
PCTPUBEXP -0.137  0.009  -0.111 0.020 -0.130 0.013  -0.111 0.020
PREMTAX 0.006  0.759  0.003 0.859 
PREM_EMP 0.010  0.693  0.017 0.114 0.015 0.561  0.018 0.098
FEMALE 0.128  0.017  0.123 0.009 0.169 0.000  0.173 0.000
AGE < =35  0.041  0.704  0.042 0.691 
AGE > 49  0.087  0.585  0.085 0.592 
AAPCC 1.81E-04  0.136  1.41E-04 0.201 1.84E-04 0.132  1.87E-04 0.121
TOT_COMP 8.27E-07 0.296  1.07E-06 0.146  9.85E-07 0.174
MULT -0.017  0.357  -0.020 0.262 -0.016 0.376  -0.019 0.294
UNEMP -0.007  0.433  -0.008 0.361  -0.010 0.224
OCCWC 0.089  0.287  0.103 0.099  
OCCBL 0.189  0.102  0.198 0.076  
OCCU 0.034  0.844   
CONSTANT 0.363  0.002  0.353 0.000 0.420 0.000  0.432 0.000
 
Note: P = 0.000 signifies a p-value <0.0005.   36
 
Table 6: Tobit Regression Results for  Outpatient Mental Health Coverage (MHOPCOV) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
    Coeff. P>|t| Coeff. P>|t| Coeff. P>|t| Coeff. P>|t| 
PCTSAL  0.397  0.008 0.378 0.009 0.339 0.019 0.322 0.022
SQPCTSAL  -0.298  0.015 -0.286 0.018 -0.257 0.034 -0.243 0.041
MISS_SAL  0.137  0.003 0.133 0.003 0.123 0.006 0.122 0.005
EMP2  0.028  0.207        0.034 0.124  0.031 0.140
EMP3  -0.013  0.809        -0.009 0.870       
EMP4  0.046  0.080 0.037 0.057 0.044 0.099 0.042 0.084
HEAVYALC  0.007  0.042 0.007 0.044 0.007 0.043 0.007 0.043
UNION  -0.025  0.225 -0.029 0.158 -0.023 0.271 -0.025 0.221
HMO  -0.222  0.049 -0.242 0.016 -0.224 0.047 -0.259 0.010
MANDATE  0.047  0.356 0.039 0.185 0.042 0.408 0.038 0.202
MAND_EMP  -0.032  0.604        -0.028 0.649       
PARITY  0.003  0.955        0.010 0.873       
PAR_EMP  0.159  0.036 0.159 0.001 0.154 0.043 0.160 0.001
MTR  -0.430  0.206 -0.479 0.154 -0.368 0.280 -0.403 0.230
PCTPUBEXP -0.146  0.007 -0.134 0.008 -0.137 0.012 -0.129 0.010
PREMTAX  0.003  0.889        0.000 0.993       
PREM_EMP  0.008  0.750        0.014 0.596  0.014 0.200
FEMALE  0.141  0.011 0.140 0.008 0.192 0.000 0.193 0.000
AGE < =35  0.041  0.719        0.035 0.752       
AGE > 49  0.059  0.722        0.052 0.751       
AAPCC  1.63E-04  0.196 1.33E-04 0.253 1.70E-04 0.181 1.30E-04 0.269
TOT_COMP  8.76E-07  0.284 8.85E-07 0.265 1.10E-06 0.154 1.00E-06 0.182
MULT  -0.015  0.420        -0.015 0.425       
UNEMP  -0.006  0.553        -0.007 0.454       
OCCWC  0.105  0.224  0.093 0.170            
OCCBL  0.239  0.046  0.254 0.029            
OCCU  0.082  0.643                   
CONSTANT  0.358  0.003 0.407 0.000 0.435 0.000 0.436 0.000
 
Note: P = 0.000 signifies a p-value <0.0005. 
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Table 7: Tobit Regression Results for Inpatient Mental Health Coverage (MHIPCOV) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
    Coeff. P>|t| Coeff. P>|t| Coeff. P>|t| Coeff. P>|t| 
PCTSAL 0.101  0.682  0.096 0.042 0.268 0.271  0.112 0.013
SQPCTSAL  -0.021  0.919        -0.132 0.521       
MISS_SAL  -0.043  0.567  0.368 0.033 0.007 0.920       
EMP2 0.065  0.079  0.063 0.079 0.055 0.135  0.057 0.117
EMP3  0.004  0.968        0.010 0.915       
EMP4  -0.010  0.816        4.68E-06 1.000       
HEAVYALC  0.007  0.214  0.009 0.090 0.007 0.249       
UNION  0.012  0.730        -0.007 0.832       
HMO  -0.081  0.668        -0.038 0.842       
MANDATE -0.165  0.051  -0.097 0.071 -0.162 0.060  -0.102 0.063
MAND_EMP  0.118  0.257        0.103 0.330       
PARITY 0.238  0.017  0.167 0.008 0.216 0.033  0.171 0.007
PAR_EMP  -0.093  0.466        -0.073 0.573       
MTR 0.707  0.218  0.691 0.183 0.502 0.386  0.551 0.294
PCTPUBEXP  -0.041  0.647        -0.052 0.570       
PREMTAX 0.039  0.259  0.035 0.152 0.041 0.233  0.041 0.100
PREM_EMP 0.030  0.501  0.034 0.041 0.026 0.568  0.026 0.136
FEMALE  -0.013  0.889        -0.078 0.335  -0.113 0.096
AGE < =35  0.063  0.741        0.131 0.487       
AGE > 49  0.431  0.122        0.470 0.094  0.283 0.092
AAPCC 4.07E-04  0.057  4.19E-04 0.047 3.67E-04 0.091  3.92E-04 0.068
TOT_COMP  5.23E-07  0.705        1.07E-06 0.416       
MULT  -0.039  0.224  -0.036 0.246 -0.034 0.308       
UNEMP -0.026  0.108  -0.028 0.050 -0.024 0.147  -0.023 0.106
OCCWC  -0.101  0.484                   
OCCBL  -0.345  0.086  -0.266 0.053            
OCCU  -0.522  0.078  -0.330 0.142            
CONSTANT 0.402  0.049  0.295 0.010 0.235 0.204  0.365 0.001
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Appendix Table 1: IV Tobit Results for Total Mental Health Coverage (MHCOV) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
    Coeff. P>|t| Coeff. P>|t| Coeff.  P>|t| 
PCTSAL 0.405  0.010 0.335 0.016 0.323  0.017
SQPCTSAL -0.337  0.017 -0.269 0.023 -0.255  0.026
MISS_SAL 0.116  0.015 0.104 0.016 0.103  0.014
EMP2 0.020  0.430 0.028 0.205 0.032  0.131
EMP3 -0.025  0.668 -0.017 0.754 -0.032  0.195
EMP4 0.031  0.297 0.035 0.173 0.040  0.114
HEAVYALC 0.009  0.027 0.008 0.021 0.008  0.019
UNION -0.030  0.195 -0.022 0.272 -0.023  0.239
HMO -0.197  0.094 -0.212 0.051 -0.217  0.018
MANDATE  0.016  0.768 0.020 0.685      
MAND_EMP  -0.002  0.976 -0.007 0.905      
PARITY  0.025  0.690 0.031 0.595      
PAR_EMP 0.108  0.192 0.117 0.119 0.148  0.000
MTR  -0.617  0.166 -0.414 0.227      
PCTPUBEXP  -0.177 0.010 -0.150 0.006 -0.111  0.021
PREMTAX  0.012  0.593 0.007 0.721      
PREM_EMP  -0.004  0.903 0.007 0.792      
FEMALE 0.242  0.053 0.203 0.000 0.199  0.000
AGE < =35  0.191  0.307 0.091 0.427      
AGE > 49  0.215  0.313 0.127 0.437      
AAPCC 1.34E-04  0.335 1.68E-04 0.174 1.65E-04  0.167
TOT_COMP 5.89E-06  0.237 3.16E-06 0.087 2.54E-06  0.109
MULT -0.018  0.363 -0.019 0.317 -0.019  0.274
UNEMP -0.014  0.241 -0.011 0.244 -0.011  0.188
OCCWC  -0.063  0.714            
OCCBL  0.055  0.761            
OCCU  0.041  0.826            
CONSTANT  0.310 0.024 0.368 0.001 0.427  0.000
Bassman  P   0.1663  0.3867   
 
Notes: P = 0.000 signifies a p-value <0.0005. Bassman statistic based on linear IV model. 
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Appendix Table 2: IV Tobit Results for  Outpatient Mental Health Coverage 
(MHOPCOV) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
    Coeff. P>|t| Coeff. P>|t| Coeff.  P>|t| 
PCTSAL 0.430  0.008 0.340 0.018 0.315  0.025 
SQPCTSAL -0.359  0.014 -0.278 0.023 -0.260  0.029 
MISS_SAL 0.131  0.007 0.114 0.011 0.106  0.015 
EMP2  0.017  0.512 0.027 0.241      
EMP3  -0.025  0.669 -0.017 0.757      
EMP4 0.035  0.244 0.039 0.144 0.032  0.101 
HEAVYALC 0.009  0.032 0.008 0.025 0.008  0.019 
UNION -0.033  0.164 -0.023 0.259 -0.029  0.143 
HMO -0.210  0.082 -0.229 0.042 -0.237  0.014 
MANDATE 0.034  0.541 0.038 0.461 0.036  0.212 
MAND_EMP  -0.016  0.819 -0.020 0.752      
PARITY  0.005  0.935 0.013 0.822      
PAR_EMP 0.132  0.122 0.139 0.071 0.154  0.001 
MTR -0.703  0.125 -0.473 0.181 -0.544  0.108 
PCTPUBEXP -0.185  0.008 -0.155 0.006 -0.137  0.007 
PREMTAX  0.008  0.708 0.003 0.877      
PREM_EMP  -0.005  0.869 0.007 0.804      
FEMALE 0.253  0.048 0.224 0.000 0.227  0.000 
AGE < =35  0.187  0.329 0.080 0.500      
AGE > 49  0.184  0.399 0.091 0.589      
AAPCC  1.17E-04  0.415 1.55E-04 0.225      
TOT_COMP 5.86E-06  0.252 3.02E-06 0.113 3.13E-06  0.048 
MULT  -0.017  0.420 -0.018 0.366      
UNEMP  -0.012  0.316 -0.010 0.328      
OCCWC  -0.045  0.801            
OCCBL  0.106  0.566            
OCCU  0.089  0.640            
CONSTANT 0.306  0.030 0.387 0.001 0.455  0.000 
Bassman  P   0.2027  0.2696   
 
Notes: P = 0.000 signifies a p-value <0.0005. Bassman statistic based on linear IV model. 
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Appendix Table 3: IV Tobit Results for Inpatient Mental Health Coverage 
(MHIPCOV) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
    Coeff. P>|t| Coeff.  P>|t|  Coeff.  P>|t| 
PCTSAL  0.142  0.590 0.270 0.266      
SQPCTSAL -0.096  0.684 -0.171 0.408 0.074  0.203 
MISS_SAL -0.050  0.526 -0.010 0.899 -0.035  0.539 
EMP2 0.052  0.218 0.042 0.273 0.042  0.244 
EMP3  -0.012  0.902 -0.006 0.945      
EMP4  -0.024  0.632 -0.008 0.852      
HEAVYALC 0.009  0.161 0.009 0.155 0.007  0.167 
UNION  0.002  0.949 -0.009 0.800      
HMO  -0.066  0.738 -0.047 0.805      
MANDATE -0.181  0.045 -0.170 0.047 -0.092  0.070 
MAND_EMP  0.138  0.214 0.120 0.258      
PARITY 0.240  0.020 0.223 0.026 0.164  0.010 
PAR_EMP  -0.127  0.365 -0.104 0.430      
MTR  0.369  0.620 0.296 0.621      
PCTPUBEXP  -0.090  0.430 -0.087 0.362      
PREMTAX 0.045  0.214 0.048 0.169 0.037  0.124 
PREM_EMP 0.013  0.801 0.011 0.803 0.024  0.158 
FEMALE  0.126  0.546 -0.017 0.852      
AGE < =35  0.244  0.435 0.216 0.278      
AGE > 49  0.587  0.100 0.544 0.056 0.307  0.071 
AAPCC 3.49E-04  0.135 3.38E-04 0.119 3.29E-04  0.119 
TOT_COMP 6.67E-06  0.423 4.77E-06 0.139 3.62E-06  0.105 
MULT  -0.041  0.227 -0.037 0.257      
UNEMP -0.034  0.088 -0.028 0.088 -0.023  0.096 
OCCWC  -0.285  0.322            
OCCBL  -0.508  0.091            
OCCU  -0.514  0.095            
CONSTANT 0.338  0.138 0.143 0.471 0.236  0.041 
Bassman P    0.1715   0.0478    
 
Note: Bassman statistic based on linear IV model. 
 